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The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
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This page provides a brief introduction to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BTWC), as well as links to websites containing additional information on the convention and on issues of biosecurity and bioethics
Image courtesy of the Royal Society
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The BTWC opened for signature in 1972 and further affirmed international norms against the use of biological agents in warfare. As of June 2005, 171 States Parties had signed the convention and 23 non-signatory parties remained (www.opbw.org). Article I of the Convention prohibits the development, acquisition, or retention of biological agents or toxins beyond what is justified for “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” as well as the development, acquisition, or retention of “[w]eapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” Recognizing the enormous potential benefits to be derived from the biological sciences, however, Article X of the Convention specifically encourages the development, application, and exchange of biological information for peaceful uses. Every five years a review conference of the BTWC is held by its States Parties.
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The States Parties adopted a variety of voluntary Confidence Building Measures at the Second and Third Review Conferences, held in 1986 and 1991, respectively. These measures included the provision of information on such topics as unusual infectious disease outbreaks, past offensive or defense biological programs, and facilities used for vaccine production or biological defense research. While States Parties are nationally responsible for upholding their obligations to the treaty, there is no official system to verify compliance. In this regard, the BTWC is different from the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was signed in 1992 and which includes official procedures for reporting and site inspections.
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The addition of a verification protocol to the BTWC was discussed and developed for many years. However, these discussions ended at the Fifth Review Conference in 2001 and are not likely to be re-visited in the immediate future. The biological sciences are enormously diverse and almost all techniques or areas of research can have legitimate and beneficial uses. This greatly complicates verification because it can be difficult to distinguish between types of research and corresponding facilities that are involved in peaceful activities, and those that might be involved in bioweapons production.
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Recent non-proliferation efforts have increasingly focused on education about potential “dual-use” issues in scientific research and the encouragement of scientific responsibility through the development of professional codes of ethics and conduct.
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Some Useful Links Related to Scientific Codes of Conduct Include:
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Image courtesy of the U.S. Department of Energy Human Genome Program, http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis
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Many organizations provide additional information on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or have projects which address issues involving chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation.
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Links to Additional Resources Include:
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For more information, please contact:
Katie Bowman
Board on International Scientific Organizations
The National Academies
kbowman@nas.edu 
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